



Software vulnerabilities & Malicious software

EECS 195

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Objectives

- Learn about memory organization, buffer overflows, and relevant countermeasures
- Common programming bugs, such as off-by-one errors, race conditions, and incomplete mediation
- Survey of past malware and malware capabilities
- Virus detection
- ~~Tips for programmers on writing code for security~~



Software security?





Leo, doctor

The system is
hacked. Find
out why?



OMG. Let
me try.



Jim, programmer



Security tools



Hospital Information System




malware
(threat)

Shared workstation

Programs and unintentional oversights

- Program
 - **Implementation** of algorithms/specifications/functionalities
 - Source code (C, C++, Java, ...)
 - Binary code (after compilation)
- Unintentional oversights
 - Human error => software flaw (vulnerabilities) => exploitation





Types of software vulnerabilities

- Buffer overflows
- TOCTTOU
- Undocumented access points (backdoors)
- ~~Off-by-one errors~~
- Integer overflows
- ~~Unterminated null-terminated string~~
- ~~Parameter length, type, or number errors~~
- Unsafe utility libraries
- Race Condition
- ...



Buffer overflows

- Oversights to document or check excessive data
- Attacker's inputs are expected to go into regions of memory allocated for data, but those inputs are instead allowed to **overwrite memory holding executable code**
- The trick for an attacker is finding buffer overflow opportunities that lead to overwritten memory being executed, and finding the right code to input
- **Break access control** on code execution and lead to **privilege escalation**




Buffer overflows (cond.)

Extremely common bug in C/C++ programs.

- First major exploit: 1988 Internet Worm. Fingerd.

whenever possible avoid C/C++

... but often cannot avoid C/C++
Need to understand
attacks and defenses




Source: web.nvd.nist.gov



Background

- Memory
 - Holding code & data
 - **Code is indistinguishable from data** in memory representation
 - Code & data can be referenced through address or CPU register
 - Both OS and user applications co-exist in memory (different space)
 - Isolation & access control (e.g., page table) at hardware/OS level to prevent unauthorized access





Program Memory Stack


```
int x = 100;
int main()
{
    // data stored on stack
    int a=2;
    float b=2.5;
    static int y;

    // allocate memory on heap
    int *ptr = (int *) malloc(2*sizeof(int));

    // values 5 and 6 stored on heap
    ptr[0]=5;
    ptr[1]=6;

    // deallocate memory on heap
    free(ptr);


    return 1;
}
```





Registers

- Data registers
 - EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX
 - Many are used for function parameters
- Pointer registers
 - EIP (Instruction Pointer): stores the offset address of the next instruction to be executed
 - ESP (Stack Pointer)
 - EBP (Base Pointer)
- Index registers
- Control registers
- Segment registers





Stack Frame

- EBP: Base Pointer
 - Points to previous frame pointer
 - EBP+offset: to locate variables
 - The return address will always be at EBP+4, the first parameter will always be at EBP+8, and the first local variable will be at EBP-4 (or EBP-8).
- ESP: Stack Pointer, pointing to the stack top (low address)
 - shifted when POP&PUSH



Order of the function arguments in stack

```
void func(int a, int b)
{
    int x, y;

    x = a + b;
    y = a - b;
}
```

gcc -S <filename>: c to assembly


$x = a + b$

```
movl    12(%ebp), %eax    ; b is stored in %ebp + 12
movl    8(%ebp), %edx     ; a is stored in %ebp + 8
addl    %edx, %eax
movl    %eax, -8(%ebp)    ; x is stored in %ebp - 8
```




Function Call Stack

```
void f(int a, int b)
{
    int x;
}
void main()
{
    f(1,2);
    printf("hello world");
}
```





Stack Layout for Function Call Chain





Vulnerable Program

```
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    char str[400];
    FILE *badfile;

    badfile = fopen("badfile", "r");
    fread(str, sizeof(char), 300, badfile);
    foo(str);

    printf("Returned Properly\n");
    return 1;
}
```

- Reading 300 bytes of data from badfile.
- Storing the file contents into a str variable of size 400 bytes.
- Calling foo function with str as an argument.

Note : Badfile is created by the user and hence the contents are in control of the user.




Vulnerable Program

```
/* stack.c */
/* This program has a buffer overflow vulnerability. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

int foo(char *str)
{
    char buffer[100];

    /* The following statement has a buffer overflow problem */
    strcpy(buffer, str); ←

    return 1;
}
```





Consequences of Buffer Overflow

Overwriting return address with some random address can point to :

- Invalid instruction
- Non-existing address
- Access violation
- **Attacker's code** —————→ **Malicious code to gain access**



How to Run Malicious Code

