



# Tracking Bug (Privacy Issue)

- Tiny image unseen to web users
- URL linked to third-party site
- Can be used by an advertiser to track a buyer across shopping sites







# Tracking with Browser Cookies

- Cookies are a small bit of information stored on a computer associated with a specific server
  - When you access a website, it might store information as a cookie
  - Every time you visit that server, the cookie is re-sent to the server
  - Effectively used to hold state information over sessions
- Cookies can hold any type of (sensitive) information
  - Passwords, credit card information, social security number, etc.
  - Session cookies, non-persistent cookies, persistent cookies



### More on Cookies

- Cookies are stored on your computer and can be controlled
  - Many sites require that you enable cookies in order to use the site
  - Their storage on your computer naturally lends itself to exploits
  - You can (and probably should) clear your cookies on a regular basis

#### Cookies expire

- The expiration is set by the sites' session by default, which is chosen by the server (e.g., Jan. 1, 2036)
- This means that cookies will probably stick around for a while





# **Taking Care of Your Cookies**

#### • Managing your cookies in Chrome:

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🛗 Apps ★ Bookmarks 🗀 New folder ★ Bookmarks 📓 MIT/LL Intranet 🚸 LLCAD 💽 GitHub 💥 LAHTE 🔎 CSRankings: Compu 💥 Group 51 🗅 CS Wiki 🗎 Other Bookmarks				
$\equiv$ Settings	Q Search settings			
	← Cookies	8		
	Allow sites to save and read cookie data (recommended)			
	Keep local data only until you quit your browser			
	Block third-party cookies Prevent third-party websites from saving and reading cookie data			
	Block ADD			
Question:	user can't be tracked if cookie	is cleaned?		
	Clear on exit ADD			
	Allow ADD			
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# Persistent User Tracking

- Tracking users over time, even after users clean cookies
- Tracking (sharing) users across trackers
- Tracking users over time
  - Canvas fingerprinting
  - Ever cookie (flash cookies)
  - Cookie syncing: different trackers share user identifiers





# 1. Canvas Fingerprinting

- Tracker seeks to uniquely identify a user/browser
  - Let the browser render some text (can be invisible to users)
  - Generate browser signatures based text rendering



Very subtle differences for different browsers

- Operating system
- Font library
- Graphics card
- Graphics driver
- Browser implementation





# Obtaining user or website data

- Server-side attacks
  - Dot-Dot-Slash (or directory traversal)
  - Server-Side Include (SSI)
- Client-side attacks
  - Cross-site Scripting (XSS)
  - Cross-site Request Forgery (XSRF)



# Dot-Dot-Slash

- Also known as "directory traversal," this is when attackers use the term "../" to access files that are on the target web server but not meant to be accessed from outside
- Most commonly entered into the URL bar but may also be combined with other attacks, such as XSS
- Root cause: inconsistent/missing access control

http://yoursite.com/webhits.htw?CiWebHits&File=../../../../../winnt/sys
tem32/autoexec.nt



# Example

- Passwd not protected
- User ID leaked

page 1 🔻

root x:0:0 root /root /bin/bash daemon x:1:1 daemon /usr/sbin/bin/sh bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh-sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh-sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/bin/sh lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/bin/sh mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/bin/sh news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/bin/sh uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/bin/sh proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/bin/sh www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/bin/sh backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/bin/sh list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/bin/sh irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/bin/sh gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/bin/sh nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/bin/sh ibuuid x 100 101 /var/lib/libuuid /bin/sh Debianexim:x:101:103::/var/spool/exim4:/bin/false\_statd:x:102:65534::/var/lib/nfs:/bin/false pilou:x:1000:1000:pilou,,,:/home/pilou:/bin/bash sshd:x:103:65534::/var/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin mysql:x:104:1001::/home/mysql:/bin/sh messagebus:x:105:106::/var/run/dbus:/bin/false\_avahi:x:106:107:Avahi\_mDNS\_ daemon,,,:/var/run/avahi-daemon:/bin/false haldaemon:x:107:109:Hardware abstraction layer,,,;/var/run/hal:/bin/false pulse:x:108:111:PulseAudio daemon,,,:/var/run/pulse:/bin/false





## Server-Side Include (SSI)

- SSI is an interpreted server-side scripting language that can be used for basic web server directives, such as including files and executing commands, like sending email after user click button on web page
- SSI attack allows the exploitation of a web application by injecting scripts in HTML pages or executing arbitrary codes remotely
- The web server parses and executes the directives before supplying the page. Then, the attack result will be viewable the next time that the page is loaded for the user's browser.

<!--#exec cmd="/usr/bin/telnet &"-->





## Client-side Security: Browser Policies

- Key mechanism: Same-origin policy (SOP)
  - SOP is a sandbox model: only the site that stores the information in the browser can read or modify that information
- An untrusted page cannot corrupt the user's actions at other sites nor can it issue transactions on behalf of the user
- Applies to cookies, JavaScript access to DOMs, and plugins
  - Cookies: cookie from origin A not visible to origin B
  - DOM (Document Object Model) : script from origin A cannot read or set properties for origin B





# Confining the Power of JavaScript Scripts

- Given all that power, browsers need to make sure JS scripts don't abuse it
- For example, don't want a script sent from hackerz.com web server to read cookies belonging to bank.com...
- ... or alter layout of a bank.com web page
- ... or read keystrokes typed by user while focus is on a bank.com page!



## SOP







# Same-origin Examples

- Origin: protocol, hostname, port, but not path
- Same Origin
  - http://www.example.org/here
  - http://www.example.org/there
  - same protocol: http, host: example, default port 80
- How about these?
  - http://www.example.org/here
  - https://www.example.org/there
  - http://www.example.org:8080/hello
  - http://www.hacker.org/you



# More on SOP

Origin comparisons with <a href="http://store.company.com/dir/page.html">http://store.company.com/dir/page.html</a>

URL	Outcome	Reason
http://store.company.com/dir2/other.html	Success	-
http://store.company.com/dir/inner/another.html	Success	-
https://store.company.com/secure.html	Failure	Different protocol
http://store.company.com:81/dir/etc.html	Failure	Different port
http://news.company.com/dir/other.html	Failure	Different host





### SOP protection scope

- Content (e.g. JavaScript) from site A and site B are under different windows, frames and iframes, separated by SOP
  - <iframe src="siteB"></iframe></iframe>
- If site A includes site B through script tag, unprotected by SOP
  - <script src="siteB">...</script></script></script>
- If site A includes code in URL parameters, unprotected by SOP
  XSS, XSRF





# Cross-site Scripting (XSS)

- Problem: Lack of input sanitization on a trusted website
- Attack: attacker submits code as data to a trusted website; later, the trusted website serves that malicious script to users
- Outcome: allows the attacker to have their scripts run as if they were a part of the trusted site





# Types of XSS Attacks

- Non-persistent (Reflected) XSS Attack
- Persistent (Stored) XSS Attack



#### Non-persistent (Reflected) XSS Attack



If a website with a reflective behavior takes user inputs, then :

- Attackers can put JavaScript code in the input
- When the input is reflected back, the JavaScript code will be injected into the web page





#### Vulnerable HTML page

http://www.example.com/search?input=word

```
<HTML>
<script>
function getUrlVars() {
  var vars = \{\};
  var parts = window.location.href.replace(/[?&]+([^=&]+)=([^&]*)/gi, function(m,key,value) {
     vars[key] = value;
  });
  return vars;
var input = getUrlVars()["input"];
</script>
<div id="output"></div>
<script> document.getElementById("output").innerText = "User searched " + input; </script>
</HTML>
```





#### Non-persistent (Reflected) XSS Attack

```
<u>http://www.example.com/search?input=</u><script>alert("attack");</script>
                                                                                     After JavaScript runs
    <HTML>
    <script>
    function getUrlVars() {
       var vars = \{\};
       var parts = window.location.href.replace(/[?&]+([^=&]+)=([^&]*)/gi, function(m,key,value) {
         vars[key] = value;
       });
                                           An embedded page on this page says
       return vars;
                                           attack
                                                                                 OK
    var input = getUrlVars()["input"];
    </script>
    <div id="output"> User searched <script> alert("attack"); </script> </div>
    <script> document.getElementById("output").innerText = "User searched " + input; </script>
    </HTML>
```





#### How to attack user

- The attacker sends the following URL to the victim
  - <u>http://www.example.com/search?input=<script>alert("attack");</script></u>
- The victim clicks on this link
- Malicious JavaScript code executed on example.com
  - This example pops up the a dialog
  - But real-world attacker can do much more, like leaking cookies to attacker's website, installing keylogger
- This example is also named DOM XSS