



## **Security Features**

- Application sandbox
  - Each application runs with its UID in its own runtime environment
    - Provides CPU protection, memory protection
  - Access control to resources based on SELinux (MAC model)
- Applications announce permission requirement
  - Create a whitelist model user grants access at install time
- Communication between applications
  - May share same Linux user ID
    - Access files from each other
    - May share same Linux process and runtime environment
  - Or communicate through application framework
    - "Intents," reference monitor checks permissions





### **Android Permissions**

- Example of permissions provided by Android
  - "android.permission.INTERNET"
  - "android.permission.READ\_EXTERNAL\_STORAGE
  - "android.permission.SEND\_SMS"
  - "android.permission.BLUETOOTH"
- Also possible to define custom permissions





### Android Permission Model


	Coogle Maps Google INC.	
	Accept & download	
<pre><uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE"></uses-permission></pre>	Read contact data, write contact data	>
<pre><uses-permission android:name="android.permission.NFC"></uses-permission></pre>	Phone calls Read phone state and identity	>
<pre><uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET"></uses-permission></pre>	Network communication NEW: Control Near Field Communication	
	Full Internet access	>
	See all	~

https://www.owasp.org/images/3/3e/Danelon\_OWASP\_EU\_Tour\_2013.pdf





### Android Permission Model



https://www.owasp.org/images/3/3e/Danelon\_OWASP\_EU\_Tour\_2013.pdf





### Android market

- Apps are signed by the developers
- App scanning when uploaded to market
  - Bouncer for Google Play
- Open market
  - Bad applications may show up on market
  - Shifts focus from remote exploit to privilege escalation



### Bouncer in a nutshell

- Runtime analysis of app
- Emulated Android environment
- Runs for 5 minutes
- On Google's infrastructure
- User action simulated to trigger and detect malicious payload

Required: Select your a	pplication's APK	
	Browse	Upload
ptional: Add an expans	ion file	
	MB APK limit, you can add expansion files	Learn more
		Learn more

#### Evading Android Runtime Analysis Through Detecting Programmed Interactions

### How to evade?

Wenrui Diao The Chinese University of Hong Kong dw013@ie.cuhk.edu.hk

Zhou Li ACM Member Zhou Lizcarl@gmail.com Xiangyu Liu The Chinese University of Hong Kong Ix012@ie.cuhk.edu.hk


Kehuan Zhang The Chinese University of Hong Kong khzhang@ie.cuhk.edu.hk





### IOT (Internet of Things)

Smart Home







### **Beyond Smart Home**

### **Autonomous Vehicles**

### **Smart Cities**





### **Industrial Internet**










### What's different with IoT security?

- Customized hardware & OS
  - Resource-limited and energy-saving
  - Not all security features can be applied
- Customized network protocols and behaviors
  - Can enable new security and privacy issues
- Physical interactions with environment
  - New input and output channels whose security and privacy implications are not well understood



## Real-time microcontroller systems (MCS)

- A real-time operating system (RTOS) designed in 1991.
  - Used in Avionics, Medical equipment and devices, Industrial controls, Automotive
- No process memory isolation
  - No Memory Management Unit (MMU), no virtual memory
  - Memory space shared by all processes
- No kernel memory isolation
  - Do not make use of 1) privileged and unprivileged processor modes and 2) Memory Protection Unit (MPU)




Securing Real-Time Microcontroller Systems through Customized Memory View Switching, NDSS'18





### Privacy leakage from IoT network traffic








## Side-channel inference from sensors

Wearable device with sensors





□ Enable a broad range of useful applications



### Sensitive information could be leaked

Electronic door lock



ATM machine



Accessing sensors doesn't require any permission!

Keypad controlled server





Friend or Foe? Your Wearable Devices Reveal Your Personal PIN, AsiaCCS'14




### Inferring what you type through accelerometers


#### Input "5419-Enter"







#### **Key-click trace** segmentation










#### Subpath recovery















6/7/2019



### Slides credit

- Security in computing 5<sup>th</sup> edition, Textbook Slides
- DISSECTING GOOGLE BOUNCER Lecture 11a, Muhammad Rizwan Asghar
- Mobile Device and Platform Security, John Mitchell





# **Course Summary**


**EECS 195** 

Spring 2019

Zhou Li












#### Cloud, Desktop, Mobile, IoT, ...










Leo, doctor



Jim, programmer





### Authentication

- Definition
  - The act of proving that a user is who she says she is
- Methods:
  - Something the user *knows* (password, security questions)
  - Something the user is (biometrics)
  - Something user has (token)



### Access Control

- Goals
  - Limiting who can access what in what ways
- Access control components
  - Reference monitor
  - Policy storage: access control directory/matrix/list
- Real-world examples
  - Linux permission bits, ...



## Cryptography

- Goals
  - Protect confidentiality, integrity and authenticity when authentication and access control cannot be performed
- Stream Cipher
  - OTP: key and plaintext are of same size
  - Stream cipher based on PRG: e.g., RC4
- Block Cipher
  - DES, AES, Modes of Operation
- Asymmetric key encryption
  - RSA, key exchange protocols
  - PKI for public key distribution and identity verification
  - Message integrity: cryptographic checksum





### Software Security

- Stack: stack frame, registers
- Buffer overflow
  - Malicious data overwrite the return address of current stack frame and with the address of shell code
  - Protection: StackGuard, ASLR, DEP, ...
- Other vulnerabilities
  - Integer overflow, race conditions, ...
- Malware





## OS Security

- OS Provides interface between software and hardware, resource management, protection and isolation
- Memory management
  - Fence register, base/bounds registers
  - Virtual memory: segmentation and paging
  - Contemporary design: MMU, TLB, page protection/presence bit
- Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
- Rootkits



## Network Security

- Networks are threatened by attacks aimed at packet interception, modification, fabrication, and interruption
- Attacks depend on layers and protocols
- Data-link layer
  - WiFi: WEP, WPA, WPA2
- Network layer
- Transport layer: Syn flooding, TCP session hijacking
- Application layer: DNS spoofing
- Protection: Protocol (TLS), Tools (Firewall, IDS, VPN)





### Web & Database Security

- Browser is the main target of web attacks
- Privacy issues of web
  - User tracking: cookies, device fingerprinting
- Web Attacks
  - Injection attack exploiting JavaScript: XSS, XSRF
- Unique attacks against database
  - Statistical inference attacks: arithmetic (sum, count)
  - SQL Injection



### Privacy

- What data is considered private is subjective
- Confidentiality protects what one person considers private
- Privacy laws and act
  - 1974 Privacy Act, GDPR, HIPAA, CCPA
- De-anonymization attacks
  - Defense: differential privacy
- New privacy enhancement technologies: anonymous communication (Tor)



## Don't Forget!

### • Final exam

- 06/12 (Wed) 8-10AM DBH 1429 (same room)
- Similar format as mid-term, close-book, no calculationintensive problems, scratch paper provided
- Course evaluation
  - Due 06/09



### The Last Slide 😳

- I'm looking for PhD students interested in security & privacy
  - Skills needed: code analysis,
  - My primary research areas: side-channel analysis, Internet measurement, data-driven security analytics, and IoT security
  - More can be found on <a href="https://faculty.sites.uci.edu/zhouli/">https://faculty.sites.uci.edu/zhouli/</a>
- I'm advising senior design teams starting from Fall 2019
- If you want to do individual research/study with me
  - A few open slots
  - Let's talk